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bstract
We present a synopsis about the commentaries to the target article “Integrating cooperative breeding into theoretical concepts of cooperation”,
n which we attempted to integrate general mechanisms to explain cooperative behaviour among unrelated individuals with classic concepts to
xplain helping behaviour in cooperative breeders that do not invoke kin-based benefits. Here we (1) summarize the positions of the commentators
oncerning the main issues we raised in the target article and discuss important criticisms and extensions. (2) We relate our target article to some
ecent reviews on the evolution of cooperation and, (3) clarify how we use terminology with regard to cooperation and cooperative behaviour. (4)
e discuss several aspects that were raised with respect to cooperative interactions including by-product mutualism, generalised reciprocity and
ulti-level selection and, (5) examine the alternatives to our classification scheme as proposed by some commentaries. (6) Finally, we highlight
everal aspects that might hinder the application of game theoretical mechanisms of cooperation in cooperatively breeding systems. Although there
s broad agreement that cooperative breeding theory should be integrated within the more general concepts of cooperation, there is some debate
bout how this may be achieved. We conclude that the contributions in this special issue provide a fruitful first step and ample suggestions for
1uture directions with regard to a more unified framework of cooperation in cooperative breeders.eywords: Cooperative breeding; Cooperation theory; Pseudo-reciprocity; Reciprocity; Multi-level selection; By-product mutualism
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2. Introduction
The main aim of our target paper (Bergmu¨ller et al., 2007)
as to integrate some ‘classic concepts’ to explain coopera-
ive behaviour between unrelated individuals in the field of
ooperative breeding into ‘general’ cooperation theory. To iden-
ify the single components involved in cooperative interactions
e argued that it is helpful to distinguish between interac-
ions that involve: (1) no investment versus investment; (2)
y-product benefits versus costly responses; (3) direct versus
ndirect responses and (4) positive versus negative control mech-
nisms. We found that (a) the concepts for direct benefits of
ooperation in the field of cooperative breeding can be trans-
ated into mechanisms in cooperation theory; (b) some concepts
n the field of cooperative breeding (pay-to-stay, group augmen-
ation and prestige) are imprecise as they incorporate multiple
echanisms; and (c) some potentially important mechanisms
n cooperation theory (e.g. negative pseudo-reciprocity (but see
amilton (2007)), indirect pseudo-reciprocity and cross gen-
rational ‘reciprocity’) remain to be addressed theoretically.
inally, we argued that for a closer integration of both fields
e need to pay more attention to the following future issues:
a) N-player interactions; (b) asymmetries between the players;
c) outside options/biological markets; (d) interactions of kin-
ased versus non-kin-based mechanisms of cooperation; and (e)
nterdependence between individuals.
We were encouraged by the responses; all commenters agreed
hat it is important to attempt to integrate the concepts used to
xplain helping in cooperative breeding within general coop-
ration theory. However, as one would expect, there is some
ebate about how this can be achieved. Some of the first authors
or comments are also, or primarily, interested in cooperation
heory (Connor, 2007; Hamilton, 2007; Kokko, 2007; Noe¨,
007; Roberts and Sherratt, 2007; Sachs and Rubenstein, 2007;
kubic, 2007), but most commentaries were provided by empiri-
ists in the field of cooperation, most of them working on
ooperatively breeding species. These authors covered much
f the broad spectrum of cooperatively breeding animal taxa
anging from social insects (Field and Cant, 2007; Korb and
einze, 2007), fishes (Buston and Balshine, 2007; Hamilton,
007; Skubic, 2007; Taborsky, 2007), birds (Berg and Williams,
007; Cockburn, 2007; Covas et al., 2007; Doerr et al., 2007;
kman, 2007; Hatchwell, 2007; Komdeur, 2007; Wright, 2007)
o mammals (Connor, 2007; Gilchrist, 2007) including primates
Noe¨, 2007; Snowdon and Cronin, 2007) and humans (Kramer,
007). We hope this joint effort will also contribute to close
he prevailing gap between research on invertebrate and verte-
rate cooperative breeding and foster communication between
he fields.
Unsurprisingly, the commentators raised several issues we
id not address in our target article. It is clearly beyond the
s
t
ocope of our reply to address all the issues that were raised in
he 22 commentaries. Instead, we ask the reader to read the
ommentaries her-/himself for some aspects that are missing in
his synopsis. In order to give the reader some orientation about
here to find which additions/criticisms, we sent out a ques-
ionnaire to the authors of commentaries, asking them (a) to
xplicitly state on which major points they agreed or disagreed
ith regards to our article and (b) to summarise the main mes-
age of the commentary in one sentence. Most authors replied. In
ection 2 we provide the results of the questionnaire and address
hese results and other issues raised by the commentators that
e consider particularly important or interesting. In Section 3
e position our target article relative to some recent reviews on
ooperation. In Section 4, we re-address the issue of terminol-
gy. In Section 5 we attempt to clarify our position with regards
o some basic disagreements on the various cooperation con-
epts of cooperation/cooperative breeding, and in Section 6 we
iscuss the proposed alternative classification concepts provided
y the commenters. Finally, in Section 7 we discuss some factors
hat may hinder the application of game theory to cooperation
n cooperatively breeding systems.
. Summary of responses
As a response to our questionnaire, 20 out of the 22 authors (or
roups of authors) returned the questionnaire. In general, the rate
f agreement with regards to our main points was high (around
1%). However, a few points remained disputed (Table 1).
Our claim that it should be possible to describe the concepts
hat are used in cooperative breeding literature to explain helping
n terms of ‘general’ cooperation language was the only sub-
ect of obvious disagreement with regards to our main points.
e suspect, there are two main reasons for this: (1) a number
f authors objected to our focus on mechanism of cooperation
aintained by direct fitness benefits (hence our exclusion of kin
ased cooperation) with regards to the important mechanisms
f cooperation (Korb and Heinze, 2007; Taborsky, 2007) and
2) the main mechanisms of cooperation appear too simplistic
o describe complex patterns of cooperation as can be found
n many cooperative breeders (see for instance the problem of
-player interactions, Cockburn, 2007). We will discuss these
ssues below. A third possible reason for why some authors dis-
greed with this point was perhaps the formulation “concepts can
e ‘reduced’ to mechanisms of cooperation”. While we meant
o ask whether the commenters agreed that the concepts in coop-
rative breeding can be ‘translated’ or ‘described’ in terms of
eneral cooperation language, some authors might have under-
tood a different meaning of the phrase. We have summarized
he main message of the articles by the commentators in Table 2.
Naturally, the authors of the commentaries tended to focus
n specific issues of our initial article or on how our article
Table 1
Short summary of the main points developed in each commentary
I agree Not sure I disagree No answer %I agree
Main issues of the review
Integration of cooperative breeding (CB) and ’general’ cooperation are important 20 0 0 0 100
Concepts in the field of CB can be reduced to mechanisms of cooperation 8 2 10 0 40
Concepts in the field of CB are ill-defined, some incorporate multiple mechanisms 16 3 0 1 80
Some potentially important mechanisms have yet to be addresses theoretically 16 3 1 0 80
Average agreement 75
The following key distinctions are helpful to investigate cooperation in cooperatively breeding systems
No investment vs. investment 16 2 2 0 80
By-product vs. costly response 16 2 2 0 80
Direct vs. indirect response 14 5 1 0 70
Positive vs. negative control mechanism 16 2 2 0 80
Average agreement 77.5
Some important future issues are
N-player cooperation 15 5 0 0 75
Asymmetries 17 3 0 0 85
Outside options/biological markets 18 2 0 0 90
Interactions of kin-based vs. non-kin-based mechanisms of cooperation 19 1 0 0 95
Interdependence/long lasting relationships 19 1 0 0 95
Average agreement 88
Overall agreement 81
Table 2
The table summarizes the responses of 20 commentators to our questionnaire
Berg and Williams We are constrained by our ability to collect the kind and quality of field data that would be necessary for effective
integration of cooperation and cooperative breeding theory.
Buston and Balshine The evolution of cooperative behavior can be understood by comparing payoffs of cooperative and alternative actions,
accrued directly and indirectly, in present and future.
Cockburn Because help inevitably involves interactions with two players (same sex and opposite sex dominant) it is impossible to
portray the fitness outcomes as a dyadic interaction
Connor* Invested, extracted and byproduct benefits: a modified scheme for the evolution of cooperation.
Covas, McGregor and Doutrelant Communication network framework might help understanding cooperation in cooperatively breeding systems.
Doerr, Doerr and Safran Cooperative breeding is more than just helping–delayed dispersal should also be integrated into broader theoretical work on
social group formation.
Ekman The four questions do not include the environment or design, but focus on fitness as an outcome of individual interactions.
Field and Cant In primitively eusocial wasps, cooperation may have a limited role in explaining patterns of helping, but reciprocity is
generally not involved.
Gilchrist Communal breeding species with low reproductive skew need to be considered; defining and identifying the recipient of
help is crucial to determining the game-theory pathway.
Hamilton This is a helpful scheme for organising and clarifying theories CB, but CB societies involve complexities that are often not
considered in more general theories of cooperation.
Hatchwell The framework will help to clarify hypotheses for the evolution of cooperative breeding among unrelated individuals and
identify avenues for future theoretical research.
Kokko* Cooperative behaviour and cooperative breeding: what constitutes an explanation?
Komdeur* Constraints on evolutionary shifts in cooperative breeding
Korb and Heinze Dissecting without taking fitness into account might remain descriptive and limited to proximate aspects.
Kramer The framework proposed by the authors is valuable in helping to resolve the theortic challenges of situating humans, who
routinely rely on the nonmaternal help to raise offspring, in the framework of cooperative breeding.
Noe¨ Partner choice should play a more central role. Choice by breeders is virtually guaranteed if there are several potential
helpers.
Roberts and Sherratt* Cooperative reading: some suggestions for integration of the cooperation literature.
Sachs and Rubenstein Helping behavior can evolve when there is kin structure, automatic benefits (byproducts), or reciprocation. Choice systems
are critical mechanisms to limiting cheating.
Skubic Understanding cooperative behaviour and building a cooperation theory of cooperative breeding requires inclusion of
system dynamics and feedbacks.
Snowdon and Cronin Cooperative behavior is linked with cooperative breeding and rewards to alloparents are much more important than
punishments.
Taborsky I criticize the neglect of important concepts (RS theory, generalized reciprocity) and propose a framework to explain
non-kin cooperation by (1) reciprocity, (2) social prestige and (3) coercion.
Wright The complexity of the scheme illustrates the current confusion within cooperative breeding, and omits important issues
concerning social prestige and group augmentation.
We calculated the level of agreement as the proportion of ‘I agree’ responses out of 20.
*Denotes the title of the contribution of those authors who did not provide a summary of their commentary.
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would be relevant to their particular field. For clarity, we had
ocussed on some mechanism to explain cooperative behaviour
n cooperative breeding (group augmentation, pay-to-stay and
ocial prestige) knowing that there are many other concepts to
xplain helping behaviour. Some authors (Field and Cant, 2007;
ilchrist, 2007; Hamilton, 2007; Taborsky, 2007) wondered how
eproductive skew theory relates to our framework. Reproduc-
ive skew models integrate ecological, genetic and social factors
n a single explanatory framework to explain the degree of
artitioning reproduction among helpers and breeders (Emlen,
997). Partitioning of reproduction may either be cooperatively
nvolving a positive control mechanism (i.e. in complete con-
rol models of RS, also called concession, incentives or optimal
kew models of RS), or it may be enforced, i.e. involving a neg-
tive control mechanism (restraint models of RS), or it may not
e cooperative but a result of competition between helpers and
reeders (tug of war models) (Johnstone, 2000; Magrath et al.,
004). Restraint models of reproductive skew show obvious par-
llels to pay-to-stay based explanations for helping (Kokko et al.,
002; Bergmu¨ller and Taborsky, 2005; Hamilton and Taborsky,
005b).
Snowdon and Cronin (2007) and Sachs and Rubenstein
2007) highlight that ‘gain in experience’ may be an impor-
ant factor promoting helping (Skutch, 1961; Brown, 1987;
omdeur, 1996). A conceptual problem with the ‘experience
ypothesis’ is that it remains unclear why parents should risk
he health/life of their offspring so that helpers may practice.
e also wish to point out that conclusive evidence on experi-
nce gain can only be acquired by showing experimentally that
ngaging in helping promotes helping proficiency. Correlational
vidence will always be confounded by differences in condition
nd quality. With respect to game theoretic concepts, experi-
nce gain qualifies as by-product mutualism: the helper gains
he benefits (experience) directly through the act of helping, the
enefits of this gain in experience do not depend on the actual
urvival and future behaviour of the offspring (as would be the
ase in pseudo-reciprocity). As yet, no study has used exper-
ments to distinguish whether experience gain is a cause or a
onsequence of helping, or whether experience can be gained
y simply delaying dispersal and watching successful breeders
Russell, 2004).
Noe¨ (2007) emphasized the importance of partner choice for
n understanding of interactions in cooperative breeders because
he level of investments should be shaped by outside options
hen there is (a) more than one helper, (b) there is conflict
etween helpers and breeders and (c) when there is a power
symmetry between helpers and breeders (see also Noe¨ et al.,
007). For instance, if there is a high supply in helpers and
herefore great demand for access to a territory, market theory
redicts that helpers should pay more to be allowed to remain in
he territory because there are many other candidates queuing for
he breeding position. Market conditions can thus lead to shifts
n the payoff matrix. Skubic (2007) highlighted that helping and
ther behaviours are state dependent. Consequently, the ‘price’ a
elper will pay for group membership at any given point of time
epends on the helpers’ and breeders’ current state, but the value
f help will also change dynamically over time. Partner choice
t
v
gan also yield partner switching as the control mechanism that
romotes cooperative behaviour (Bshary and Scha¨ffer, 2002;
errie`re et al., 2002). Partner switching is equivalent to negative
seudo-reciprocity: in case of failure to invest the partner will
elfishly end the interaction/relationship and start a new one with
nother individual.
Cockburn (2007) pointed out that cooperative breeders are
ften characterized by complex N-party interactions and illus-
rated this with Dunnocks and Superb fairy-wrens. He concludes
cooperative breeding is never a two-party game” and extends
his critique to most of the currently available models of repro-
uctive skew. We agree, but also highlight that recent studies
ave started to investigate the complexities arising when sev-
ral players are involved, e.g. due to third party interactions. For
nstance, Hamilton and Heg (2007) show that, in addition to the
nteractions between male breeder and helpers, the behaviour
f female breeders or more generally third parties can critically
nfluence the outcome of the game (see also Hamilton, 2007).
herefore, we suggest the solution to treating N-party games
s not to conclude that these interactions are too complex to be
tudied by a game theoretic approach. Instead, we need novel
heoretical approaches to determine the effects of third party
nfluences and N-player games.
. Comparison of our target article to some recent
eviews
Other conceptual papers on classifications and terminology of
ooperation have recently been published (Lehmann and Keller,
006; West et al., 2007) and Kokko (2007) suggests a meta-
eview on these and our target article would be helpful for an
nderstanding of the differences between the approaches and the
onnections between them. While it is beyond the scope of this
ynopsis to provide such a review, we will briefly relate them to
ur target paper.
West et al. (2007) address the question of semantic confusion
n the cooperation literature and Lehmann and Keller (2006)
lassify the existing models of cooperation within a general
ramework. Both demonstrate that with respect to evolution-
ry pathways, the situation is simple: the actor must gain fitness
enefits either directly (“cooperation”) or indirectly (“altruism”)
rom investing, while the recipient always gains direct fitness
enefits.
Similar to our approach, Lehmann and Keller (2006) dis-
inguished between four different classes of models to explain
ooperative behaviour, both with respect to cooperation, i.e.
a) “direct benefits” (no repeated interactions), (b) “reciproca-
ion” (repeated interactions), as well as with respect to altruism,
.e. (c) kin selection and (d) green beard. We only dealt with
he direct mechanisms of cooperation and in that respect their
istinction is similar to ours: “direct benefits” is in our terms
seudo-reciprocity (including its variations) and “reciprocation”
ould in our terms refer to all interactions where the decision
4o invest depends on return investments (i.e. reciprocity and its
ariations).
With regards to direct benefits, West et al. (2007) distin-
uished between “non enforced” and “enforced”. What we
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oalled by-product mutualism and positive pseudo-reciprocity
direct and indirect) would fall into their first class “non-
nforced” while any form of reciprocity falls into the second
lass “enforced”. Therefore, overall, both Lehmann and Keller
2006) and West et al. (2007) are similar to our view in their dis-
ussion with regards to direct mechanisms to explain cooperative
ehaviour.
However, the goals of all three papers were different. While
ehmann and Keller (2006) and West et al. (2007) investi-
ate evolutionary pathways to cooperation including direct and
ndirect routes to cooperation, we were analysing strategies or
echanisms that stabilize cooperative behaviours using a game
heoretic approach, thereby specifically focussing on how an
ndividual can increase its direct fitness in different types of
nteractions. In the literature there are three main answers to this
uestion: (1) the behaviour is no investment because the benefit
f the act is higher than its cost (i.e. it is self serving), irre-
pective of the recipient’s behaviour, i.e. by-product mutualism
West-Eberhard, 1975; Brown, 1983). (2) There is an investment
nto by-product benefits: the investment increases the by-product
enefits the investor obtains due the self-serving behaviour (Cant
nd Johnstone, 2006) of the beneficiary, i.e. pseudo-reciprocity
Connor, 1986, 1995). (3) There is an investment that provides a
enefit only if there is a return investment (by the recipient or by
hird parties), i.e. reciprocal strategies (Trivers, 1971; Alexander,
987; Connor, 1995; Nowak and Sigmund, 1998). Evolution-
ry pathways and strategies/mechanisms promoting cooperative
ehaviour are complementary issues. Although each issue can
e addressed separately, ultimately we have to understand both
spects.
. Terminology
.1. Classiﬁcation scheme for concepts of cooperation, a
lariﬁcation
The terminology in cooperation theory is currently confus-
ng (Noe¨, 2006; West et al., 2007). It appears that some authors
herefore assumed that one of our main goals was to remove
emantic confusion. This is not the case; too many terms have
een used in various ways by various researchers (see Noe¨,
006). Therefore, we decided to explain each concept we used
y its unique combination of a few key parameters. We believe
hat the advantage of our approach is that we can build up the
ompound mechanisms (the concepts of cooperation) from ele-
ent components (the parameters or key questions) that are
xplicit in their terminology. Notwithstanding, independently
f how one wants to name each parameter combination, our
ecision tree highlights the number of different concepts that
ay potentially apply to real life interactions and our tree pro-
ides clear definitions for our terminology. For example, the way
e use the term ‘punishment’, it is defined as a control mech-
nism that promotes an investment by a player who thereby
voids the negative consequences of a direct costly response
n the part of its partner. The cooperative act is therefore an
nvestment in order to avoid punishment in direct negative reci-
rocity. This approach seemed to us just a necessary basis for
h
a
B
cur main goal; to show that only a few parameters suffice to
ranslate the concepts to describe helping behaviour in cooper-
tive breeding in terms of ‘general’ cooperation terminology.
s we pointed out in our target article, group augmentation,
ay-to-stay and social prestige can easily be phrased according
o our parameter combinations, often yielding equivalents to
xisting concepts of cooperation but sometimes also resulting in
arameter combinations that have not yet been explored theoret-
cally. Many authors commented on our terminology, claiming
hat there was a more ‘obvious’ or ‘natural’ alternative, although
ymptomatic of the problem, none suggested the same alterna-
ives. It seems obvious that the only solution to avoid semantic
onfusion is to define how the terms are used (see also West et al.,
007).
.2. It is important to distinguish ‘cooperation’ from
cooperative behaviour’
We chose to distinguish between cooperation, which we
efined as an interaction that yields a fitness benefit to both par-
ies, from a cooperative act, which we defined as a behaviour that
enefits another. Several of the commenters (see also Lehmann
nd Keller, 2006; West et al., 2007) disliked this distinction,
nd suggested that it was “needlessly complicated” or “con-
using”. We disagree. The distinction between the action of a
ingle individual and the interaction between two individuals
eems to us clear and inescapable. Certainly all of us will have
ad experience in investing in another individual in hope of
return on that investment which never materialised. In such
ituations we behaved cooperatively but the interaction was not
ooperation. One can easily classify an action according to its fit-
ess consequences for the actor and for the recipient – Taborsky
2007), for instance, describes an action as mutualistic if it has
ositive consequences for both, altruistic if it has positive con-
equences for the recipient but negative for the actor, parasitic
f it has negative consequences for the recipient but positive
or the actor, and spiteful if it has negative consequences for
oth. The fitness consequences of an interaction between two
ndividuals, however, depend on the actions of both. Conse-
uently, an interaction may yield positive fitness consequences
or both players even if their individual actions do not. Suppose,
or instance, that both individuals behave cooperatively, each
onferring a benefit b on the other at a cost c to themselves. If
> c then the result of the interaction is that each player obtains
net benefit b − c > 0, despite the personally costly nature of
heir actions. Similarly, suppose that both individuals behave
n a self-serving manner, each obtaining a benefit b for them-
elves at cost c to the other. Again, if b > c then the result of
he interaction is that each obtains a net benefit; in this case, the
ooperative outcome is the result of mutual exploitation rather
han mutual cooperation. One may even imagine an interaction
n which one individual acts in a mutualistic manner, while the
ther acts parasitically, yet the outcome is beneficial to both. Per-
5aps there is no need to coin a series of new terms to describe
ll the various possible combinations of actions and outcomes.
ut there is a need to distinguish clearly between the fitness
onsequences of a single individual’s behaviour, and the fitness
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cooperate, when the environment is cooperative and, not coop-onsequences of an interaction between two or more individ-
als. When some authors are concerned with the former and
thers with the latter, the result can only be confusion. There-
ore, we wish to emphasize there is a critical distinction between
sing the two terms because whether one seeks to explain coop-
rative behaviour or cooperation are ultimately two different
ssues.
. Speciﬁc aspects with regards to cooperative
nteractions
.1. By-product mutualism: cooperation due to collateral
eneﬁts
West et al. (2007) propose that we should use the term coop-
ration only if the behaviour involved has been “selected for
ecause of its beneficial effect on the recipient”, i.e. it is an
nvestment. We agree on the most fundamental aspect: some
ehaviour resulting in cooperation should have been selected
or. In agreement with West et al. (2007) we do not believe
hat “an elephant defecating [a self-serving act] and thereby
enefiting dung beetles” qualifies as a by-product mutualism
ecause none of the behaviours has been selected for. Similar
o Clutton-Brock (2002), we suppose that in many instances of
y-product mutualism it is self-serving coordination that has
een under selection (note that coordination can be either self-
erving or an investment). For instance, we find it hard to imagine
hat groupers evolved cooperative hunting with moray eels (a
ifferent species, hence kin benefits can be excluded) partly
ecause morays benefit from it (Bshary and Grutter, 2006).
ence, in such a situation each individual clearly coordinates
ue to self-serving reasons, i.e. it is by-product mutualism.
n our view “selected because of the benefits for the recipi-
nt” applies only to pseudo-reciprocity or reciprocity while the
urely self-serving aspect is the key component of by-product
utualism.
In contrast to West et al. (2007), we do not believe that coop-
ration should be restricted to interactions involving investments
s selection may also favour self-serving behaviours that result in
ooperation due to ‘collateral benefits’ for others. For instance,
self-serving behaviour, such as ‘joining a group’ in order to
btain the benefits of safety in a group may, at the same time,
ield by-product benefits for the other group members (i.e. self-
sh herd effects (Hamilton, 1971)). Many benefits of group living
ike selfish herd, dilution, and predator confusion are due to the
y-product benefits individuals obtain by simply being together,
hile selection acts on the coordination of activities and space
se. To conclude, we believe it is fundamental to acknowledge
hat by-product benefits of self-serving behaviours are evolution-
ry relevant and may result in benefits for all involved parties,
.e. cooperation.
.2. Negative pseudo-reciprocity: can it alone lead to a
ooperative equilibrium?
Hamilton (2007) argued that negative pseudo-reciprocity
lone could never lead to a cooperative equilibrium, because
e
t
e
booperation under the threat of eviction (or suppression) needs
o involve both: negative pseudo-reciprocity (the sanction itself)
nd positive pseudo-reciprocity, in which cost reduction leads to
elfish tolerance on the part of the partner. He argues that pseudo-
eciprocity involves two steps: (1) investment in the sanction
nd then (2) a return investment in cost reduction. The only
uaranteed return from sanctioning is the direct benefit of evict-
ng or excluding the subordinate. Similarly, if the subordinate
elps, there is a return to the subordinate in form of reduced
hreat of eviction. Hamilton concludes, if one reduces nega-
ive pseudo-reciprocity to only one step, that step is eviction,
hich is not in itself cooperative. We agree on this reasoning,
ut we also emphasized that ultimately, cooperative behaviour
n negative pseudo-reciprocity can only be stabilized due to
he threat of eviction, not by eviction itself (Bergmu¨ller et al.,
007). Of course, this threat of eviction needs also to some-
ow come into being. As Hamilton (2007) points out, this may
e a result of repeated suppression. But alternatives are pos-
ible too. For instance, an individual may have been ejected
n another group and therefore knows about the cues that pre-
ict likely ejection. Alternatively, an individual might observe
viction of another individual and thereby learn about the con-
equences of not helping. Hence, although the act of terminating
he interaction with one individual is not a cooperative act and
oes not result in cooperation, it can have the by-product effect
f stabilizing cooperative behaviour in an audience. To con-
lude, we agree that negative pseudo-reciprocity alone does
ot lead to an interaction that can be called cooperation, but
t is the threat of negative pseudo-reciprocity (or punishment),
hich can.
.3. Generalized reciprocity
Generalized reciprocity results when B helps C because A
elped B independently of the identity of individuals (Hamilton
nd Taborsky, 2005a; Pfeiffer et al., 2005; Rutte and Taborsky,
007). There is evidence for generalized reciprocity in humans
Yamagishi and Cook, 1993) and rats (Rutte and Taborsky,
007). It is related to kin selection because, ultimately, both
ely on positive assortment of co-operators (Hamilton, 1975;
amilton and Taborsky, 2005a; Lehmann and Keller, 2006).
oth Skubic (2007) and Taborsky (2007) criticized our omission
f generalized reciprocity, but unfortunately neither of both com-
enters discussed how generalized reciprocity could be acting
n cooperative breeders. As interactions in cooperative breed-
rs often take place between series of different individuals (i.e.
elpers, breeders and offspring), generalized reciprocity could,
ost likely in addition to other mechanisms of cooperation, fos-
er cooperation due to synergistic effects resulting from positive
eedback. Also, it could be used as a flexible strategy enabling
ndividuals to adjust to the current environmental conditions that
esult from the behaviour of the other individuals present, i.e.
6rate, when the environment is non-cooperative. However, as yet
he significance of generalized reciprocity in explaining coop-
rative behaviour in cooperatively breeding systems remains to
e explored.
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t.4. Group augmentation: can it result from by-product
utualism?
Several authors (Kokko, 2007; Roberts and Sherratt, 2007)
riticized our proposal that ‘passive’ group augmentation could
esult from by-product mutualism. This is because group aug-
entation is a concept that intends to explain helping behaviour
nd therefore investments on the part of the helper. In ‘pas-
ive’ group augmentation (Kokko et al., 2001) a helper increases
roup size by helping to raise offspring in order to later obtain the
passive or by-product) benefits that result from living a larger
roup. The key question is whether the behaviour on the part
f the helper is indeed an investment as the authors suggest, or
self-serving behaviour that produces the by-product effect of
roviding benefits to offspring. If one starts to define group aug-
entation as a concept to explain investments, we agree that the
rst interpretation must inevitably be the case. However, helping
ay not necessarily be an investment. Instead, it may also be a
elf-serving act, for instance in the context of territory defence.
y defending the territory a helper will help augmenting the
roup because it profits directly, i.e. b > c, and the benefits con-
erred to the offspring are a by-product of self serving behaviour.
his view is similar to ‘weak altruism’ were individuals provide
roup benefits due to self-serving reasons (on the population
evel) (West et al., 2007). As group augmentation is a com-
on good problem, Wright (2007) argued it might require a
ultilevel selection explanation. Although this is an interest-
ng possibility, ‘weak altruism’ can straightforwardly explain
ehaviours that confer group benefits as a result of individual
election promoting the behaviour due to the resulting direct
enefits (see also Section 5.6).
.5. Prestige: the importance of signal reliability
Wright (2007) emphasized it is crucial to acknowledge the
ignalling dimension with regards to prestige. The Handicap
rinciple, which has always been fundamental to social pres-
ige theory (Zahavi, 1974, 1975, 1990; Wright, 1997, 1999),
ighlights that prestige can only be evolutionarily stable in
ooperative breeding systems when there is signal reliability.
ccording to the handicap principle, reliability can be achieved
hen the level of helping (a costly signal) reflects the condi-
ion dependent or genetic quality of the signaller. However, as
right (2007) pointed out, the concept of prestige can become
roblematic to apply because signal reliability may become
lurred in case additional factors critically influence the indi-
idual propensity to help. However, signal reliability may not
ecessarily be based on genetic quality. Client fish, for instance,
ase their decision about whether to interact with a particu-
ar cleaner on the service quality they observed in a previous
nteraction of the cleaner with another client (Bshary, 2002;
shary and Grutter, 2006). Apparently, the current behaviour
f the cleaner predicts to a certain extent how cooperative the
ollowing interaction will be, therefore eavesdropping on the
nteractions of others appears to contain reliable information
or clients (Covas et al., 2007). Cleaners, in turn, can make use
f an eavesdropping audience to signal their (short term) qual-
t
b
fi
mty as cleaner (Bshary and Wu¨rth, 2001; Bshary, 2002; Bshary
nd D’Souza, 2004; Bshary and Grutter, 2006). Signal relia-
ility is central for prestige based explanations of cooperative
nvestment and it remains a challenging question to determine
nder which conditions signal reliability can evolve (see also
ovas et al., 2007) so prestige can be an explanation of helping
ehaviour.
.6. Multilevel selection
Group selection has been the focus of one of the largest con-
roversies in evolutionary biology and the debate is still lively
Okasha, 2006). After Williams (1966) ended the era of ‘old
roup selection’, many scientists agreed that the appropriate
evel to study adaptation should be that of the individual. How-
ver, ‘individual’ is a somewhat arbitrary level of organisation
nd consequently researchers started to ask: why not the level of
he gene, single cell or group of individuals? Much of the current
ebate on ‘modern group selection’ (also ‘trait group selection’
r ‘multilevel selection’) appears to linger upon the often vague
efinition of ‘individual selection’ (Okasha, 2006). Hence, a
ey question to ask is: what exactly is the individual level?
sking this question immediately forces one to focus on the
evel that should be exposed to the strongest effects of selection
although selection can simultaneously act on the other levels).
trong selection can act on groups of units when lower level
nits ‘sacrifice’ their individuality, or in other words, when there
s strong interdependency between these units (Leigh, 1999),
egardless of whether this interdependency is due to related-
ess or other reasons (Roberts, 2005). For instance, genes are to
large extent interdependent within organisms, which means
hat the fitness of one gene depends on the fitness of other
enes within the same individual. Similarly, the multilevel view
as led to the sometimes fruitful concept of the ‘super organ-
sm’ in social insects, because individual colony members are
trongly interdependent within the colony (Bourke and Franks,
995; Korb and Heinze, 2004). Therefore, it seems important
o ask how the concept of multilevel selection can be used to
nderstand cooperative behaviour in other cooperative breeders
Kokko, 2007; Korb and Heinze, 2007; Hamilton, 2007; Wright,
007).
With regards to multilevel selection as an explanation for the
tability of cooperative behaviour, we recommend the papers by
ehmann and Keller (2006) and West et al. (2007). A basic con-
lusion of both papers is that the term ‘group selection’ can be
onfusing when it comes to evolutionary explanations of coop-
ration. Some reasons for the confusion are that researchers (1)
end to mix up ‘old’ and ‘new’ (multilevel) group selection, (2)
void the use of ‘new group selection’ because they think it is
nimportant (as they think is old group selection), (3) do not
ealize that kin selection theory and new group selection are
ust different ways to conceptualise the same issue: according
o new group selection cooperation is favoured when increasing
7he genetic variance between groups compared to within groups,
ut this is precisely the same as increasing the kin selection coef-
cient of relatedness (Frank, 1995). (4) Because kin selection
odels appear often easier to apply (e.g. group selection tends to
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Fide the distinction between direct and indirect benefits), (5) it is
ometimes argued that they are the ‘correct ones’ (see also West
t al., 2007). However, in all cases where both methods have been
sed to study the same problem, the results obtained were equal
Frank, 1986; Bourke and Franks, 1995; Wenseleers et al., 2004;
ardner et al., 2007). Also, the multilevel approach provides the
dvantage that it allows to separate individual level and group
evel adaptations (Price, 1970; Hamilton, 1975; Foster, 2006).
6) Finally, a crucial source of confusion is that researchers often
o not use Hamiltons’ original well defined terminology (see for
etails Okasha, 2006; West et al., 2007).
According to inclusive fitness theory, investments can be
avoured due to direct (cooperative behaviour) or indirect (altru-
stic behaviour) fitness benefits due to shared genes (Hamilton,
964). It is sometimes argued that altruistic behaviour can evolve
ithout relatedness, but this results from using a ‘narrow’ def-
nition of relatedness, i.e. due to recent common ancestry (e.g.
ilson and Ho¨lldobler, 2005). However, when using the ‘broad’
efinition (non zero relatedness between individuals) altruistic
ehaviour is by definition due to relatedness (Hamilton, 1964;
oster et al., 2006; West et al., 2007). West et al. (2007) illus-
rate in a very clear way how in ‘weak altruism’ (Wilson, 1980,
990) an individual provides benefits to the group by incur-
ing individual net costs on the group level, but at the same
ime acquiring direct net benefits on a population level. There-
ore, when the conditions for ‘weak altruism’ are met (i.e. there
s a sufficiently high synergistic effect of performing the act)
roup beneficial behaviour can result from direct benefits on
he individual level. Although the behaviour appears altruistic
t the group level, it is self-serving at the population level, and
he benefits for other group members are a result of by-product
utualism (see also Lehmann and Keller, 2006). In contrast, any
ehaviour that on average reduces the (lifetime) direct fitness
f the actor (i.e. it is altruistic) needs to increase the indirect
tness of the actor to be selected for (Lehmann and Keller,
006).
Group selection theory is mathematically equivalent to inclu-
ive fitness theory (Queller, 1992), i.e. both are combinations of
in selected and direct benefits. Therefore, kin selection theory
nd multi level selection are two compatible conceptualisations
f the same issue, i.e. both concepts require a statistical ten-
ency for the recipients of altruism to be altruists themselves
Hamilton, 1964, 1975). In physics, a pluralistic view of the
ature of light has long been established: light can sometimes
e best described as a particle but for other purposes the nature
f light is best described as a wave (Penrose, 2005). Such think-
ng might also be helpful for evolutionary thinking: selection for
ltruistic and cooperative behaviour can sometimes best be con-
eptualised either with kin selection theory or with multilevel
election theory. Multilevel selection can be helpful to describe
ow selfish behaviours (i.e. self serving, but at a cost to oth-
rs) of individual colony members in insect societies become
uppressed, or in other words, cooperative behaviour is fostered
Reeve and Keller, 1997; Korb and Heinze, 2004). It will be a
uture challenge to determine how a multi level view can help to
nderstand cooperative behaviour within cooperatively breeding
ertebrates.
p
b
v
t. Alternative classiﬁcations schemes
Not surprisingly, many authors commented on our decision
ree. Key critiques were that our tree is (a) too complex, (b) too
bstract, and (c) misses important aspects. Alternative classifi-
ations were proposed by Buston and Balshine (2007), Connor
2007), Doerr et al. (2007), Noe¨ (2007), Roberts and Sherratt
2007), Sachs and Rubenstein (2007), and Taborsky (2007).
hile each contributor felt that their classification is more ‘nat-
ral’, a comparison quickly reveals that what is natural remains
personal opinion as all proposals differ. We invite readers to
ompare for themselves and see what classifications they find
seful. For our part, we do not believe that one can get away with
more simple classification than proposed in Bergmu¨ller et al.
2007). The key distinctions – no investment versus investment,
eciprocity versus pseudo-reciprocity, positive versus negative
ontrol mechanism, and direct versus indirect interactions – are
ll important in their own right, and all possible combinations
ave to be explored to place cooperative breeding firmly into
ooperation theory. We also disagree with the critique that these
oncepts are too abstract or unnecessarily complex (Wright,
007; Buston and Balshine, 2007). Concepts are supposed to
e simplifications of the more complex real life, but simplifica-
ions that capture essential aspects of real life and theory driven
esearch is the key strength in behavioural ecology.
Buston and Balshine (2007) propose the inclusion of indi-
ect fitness benefits in our tree. However, our starting point was
hat many examples of cooperative breeding are not sufficiently
xplained with indirect fitness benefits and that our target paper
ddresses these cases. Following Hamilton (1964), direct and
ndirect fitness are additive. Therefore, an observed level of
nvestment should have a direct and an indirect component as
ong as the interaction partners are related. We addressed this
omplication in the discussion but adding it to our tree does not
elp.
Sachs and Rubenstein (2007) doubt that the distinction
etween pseudo-reciprocity and by-product mutualism is an
mportant one as in both cases, cheating is not a problem. While
he latter statement is true, there is an important difference
etween the two concepts. In by-product mutualism individu-
ls have gained at the end of the interaction (if what happens
an be called an interaction). A player keeps this gain even
f the partner drops dead the minute after. In positive pseudo-
eciprocity, the observer has to look at the future behaviour of
nteractants to resolve the puzzle of investment, and temporal
iscounting (Stephens et al., 2002; Stevens and Hauser, 2004)
ay present a psychological barrier for this kind of coopera-
ion in ‘more cognitive’ species. In negative pseudo-reciprocity,
ndividuals cooperate to avoid negative consequences from self-
erving behaviour of the partner, which is again very different
rom by-product mutualism.
Two alternative classifications were particularly interesting.
irst, Connor (2007), while agreeing with us on the four key
8arameters, proposed that the most important distinction is
etween positive and negative control mechanisms (extracted
ersus conferred benefits). We see advantages to his classifica-
ion and to ours, and simply recommend the reader to compare
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(nd to make up her/his own mind. Second, Roberts and Sherratt
2007) classified ‘direct versus indirect’ as the first key question
o ask. They also use a different terminology: direct bene-
ts are called ‘material benefits’, whereas indirect benefits are
alled ‘information’. Again, we see advantages and disadvan-
ages with their classification compared to ours. The importance
f information has also been emphasized by Wright (2007).
owever, information has to be transformed into material ben-
fits at some point, otherwise the system would not work. In
ddition, contrary to the classification proposed by Roberts and
herratt (2007), we feel that one should emphasize the differ-
nces between image scoring and prestige (competitive altruism)
ather than highlighting the similarities. In competitive altru-
sm, the observer uses the information to its own immediate
enefit (it chooses a cooperative partner), whereas in image
coring, the observer uses the information to invest into its own
mage score by helping a cooperative individual. The latter is
form of reciprocity, the former a form of pseudo-reciprocity.
ence, agreeing with several commentaries that pointed out that
seudo-reciprocity is more stable than reciprocity, competitive
ltruism should be found much more often in nature than indirect
eciprocity based on image scoring.
A special merit of the alternative scheme proposed by Roberts
nd Sherratt (2007) is that it includes N-player interactions. This
as a major shortcoming of our tree, as most openly expressed
y Cockburn (2007). We therefore appreciate very much their
ddition. While this makes the decision tree even more compli-
ated, we insist that simple classifications (Buston and Balshine,
007; Noe¨, 2007) or the restriction to an operational definition
Taborsky, 2007) fail to capture what we would like to know. The
iversity of routes to cooperation cannot be simplified without
oosing key information on the systems; we can only try to link
ll routes in a global scheme that may explain the similarities
nd differences between them.
. Aspects that may hinder the application of game
heory
.1. Consequences of inﬂexibility and constraints for
ooperation
Several authors commented that individuals might be less
exible in their decision whether to cooperate or not than
s assumed when taking a game theoretical perspective. For
nstance, (a) phylogentic constraints might predispose individ-
als of a species to behave cooperatively or not (Kokko, 2007;
kman, 2007). (b) The decision to help and to disperse may
e closely linked, even if both decision have different causes
Doerr et al., 2007; Ekman, 2007; Kokko, 2007; Noe¨, 2007).
c) Komdeur (2007) pointed out, that our assumption that indi-
iduals do have a capacity to flexibly react to the behaviours
f other individuals might not always be fulfilled (see also
kman, 2007). This is because individuals often consistently
iffer in their behavioural phenotype and that the way how they
ope with environmental challenges often correlates across func-
ionally independent contexts or situations. Such ‘behavioural
yndromes’ or ‘animal personalities’ portray a limited flexibil-
(ty in phenotypic behavioural adaptation that produces different
ypes of individuals (Drent et al., 2003; Sih et al., 2004; Bell,
007). Up to now, empirical research in cooperation and coop-
rative breeding has largely ignored the possibility of consistent
nflexible types such as ‘cooperators’ and ‘defectors’ or dif-
erent types of cooperators resulting in different behavioural
oles in social groups (but see Arnold et al., 2005; Komdeur,
006; Bergmu¨ller and Taborsky, in review; Komdeur, 2007).
uture research will need to take into account the consequences
f such inflexibilities for a conclusive understanding of the
uestion: why cooperate? This is because (a) the reasons for
uch individual inflexibilities are as yet largely unresolved and
b) their consequences of inflexibilities, such as ‘cryptic task
haring’ (Bergmu¨ller and Taborsky, in review) due to different
ehavioural roles are only starting to become evident. To con-
lude, inflexibilities or constraints may crucially determine some
f the variation in cooperative behaviour between individuals.
herefore, they must be taken into account when using game
heory to study cooperative behaviour.
.2. Who are the players?
Some commenters (Gilchrist, 2007; Field and Cant, 2007)
orrectly pointed out that the mechanism invoked to account for a
ooperative behaviour relies upon knowing who the recipient of
he act is. In two-player games recipients of interactions are obvi-
us. However, as cooperative breeding by definition involves
ore than two players (minimum: one or two breeders, a helper
nd one offspring) (Berg and Williams, 2007; Cockburn, 2007;
ilchrist, 2007) the situation is more complicated and identify-
ng the recipient of help can be problematic and depending on
ho is the recipient, the mechanism of cooperation can differ.
In practice, the true recipients of care can be difficult to iden-
ify. Suppose we have players B (the breeder), O (the offspring
f the breeder), H (the helper) and, O’ (the future offspring of
). Suppose also, that we are concerned with explaining the
aintenance of a cooperative act in a species that benefits from
iving in large groups (i.e. individuals of the species benefit from
ugmenting group size). In such systems, the distribution of help
s seldom ‘reciprocal’ in a narrow sense. Instead, help is often
xchanged between series of different individuals (e.g. H helps
, therefore B tolerates H, etc.) even between generations. Also,
he recipients of cooperative acts are not always obvious and
ommonly involve more than one individual. Below we illustrate
hese points in two examples.
1) Helper (H) could provide food directly to the breeder (B),
allowing the B to increase the survival probability of off-
spring (O), which in turn increases the probability that O
will provide food to H when H becomes a breeder at a later
date. In this situation, we could conclude that the initial
cooperative act (H feeds B) is maintained through indirect
reciprocity (i.e. O feeds H because H fed B), but differs
9from ‘classic’ indirect reciprocity as image-scoring is not
required to stabilize helping behaviour.
2) Alternatively, if helper (H) provides food directly to the
offspring (O), and at some later point, the offspring (O) pro-
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Cvides food to the offspring of the helper (O’), we might
conclude that the initial cooperative act of H is maintained
through generalized reciprocity (i.e. H helps O and as a con-
sequence O helps O’). Again, this generalized reciprocity
differs from ‘classic’ generalized reciprocity because it also
involves kin selected benefits (i.e. H and O’ are related) and
because there is a large time delay between the coopera-
tive acts of H and O. These two examples illustrate that in
order to understand the mechanism through which the initial
cooperative act is maintained, it is important to identify the
receiver(s) of benefits.
Of course, as has been pointed out (Berg and Williams,
007; Cockburn, 2007; Gilchrist, 2007), identifying whom the
ooperative act is directed towards is problematic because a
ooperative act may have (a) unobvious (for instance, result-
ng from by-products) or (b) multiple beneficiaries. The case of
nobvious beneficiaries can be exemplified most simply by com-
lete breeder load-lightening. For example, if H’s investment
owards O influences the behaviour of B such that B reduces
ts investment to O by the same amount as provided from H
o O, the primary beneficiary of H’s investment may be iden-
ified as actually being B not O. Whether we categorise the
eneficiary in this case as O or B has a significant effect on
he route through which the cooperative act by H is maintained.
f we assume that the cooperative act is directed towards O,
hen H later benefits as a by-product of self-serving actions
f a third party (i.e. the increased reproductive output of B),
hen the initial cooperative act can be explained through indirect
seudo-reciprocity. In other words, although H invests in O, it
s B and not O that provides the benefit to H, by self-servingly
roducing more offspring. Interestingly, there is no information
equired for stable cooperation in this interaction. If, by contrast,
e take the position that the cooperative act (although provided
o the offspring) is actually directed towards the breeder (e.g.
ecause providing food to the offspring is the most efficient
ay of helping the breeder), the third party is removed from
he equation and hence the initial cooperative act is maintained
hough pseudo-reciprocity.
Finally, while in some species, complete load-lightening has
een documented, it is more common for load-lightening to
e incomplete (Hatchwell, 1999). In such situations, the pro-
isioning of food from a helper to offspring has more than one
eneficiary. In other words, if H provides O with food, both O
nd B benefit. Consequently, the initial cooperative act of H is
aintained both through indirect and direct pseudo-reciprocity
see above). Such examples illustrate that the consequences of
he cooperative behaviours need to be considered with regards
o all potential beneficiaries in order to be able to classify the
nteraction to one or several concurrently acting mechanisms of
ooperation.
. ConclusionsThere seems to be wide agreement that integrating the fields
f cooperative breeding and ‘general cooperation theory’ is nec-
ssary. However, as demonstrated by the commentaries, there is
C
Ctill a significant debate about how this could be achieved. We
elieve the contributions in this special issue provide a first step
nto a fruitful direction and opened up a field of potentially pro-
uctive debate that will help to understand and integrate the
nderlying principles with regards to cooperation in coopera-
ively breeding systems.
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